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Abstract: Using unique survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, this study 
examines the influence of reciprocal inclinations on workers’ sorting into codetermined 
firms. Employees with strong negative reciprocal inclinations are more likely to work in 
firms with a works council while employees with strong positive reciprocal inclinations 
are less likely to work in such firms. We argue that these findings conform to hypotheses 
derived  from  the  experimental  literature.  Moreover,  the  results  show  striking  gender 
differences  in  the  relationship  between  reciprocity  and taste  for  representation.  These 
differences  can  be  partially  explained  by  gender-specific  differences  in  the  average 
degree of labor force attachment. 
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1. Introduction 
In  the  last  decades,  economics  has  witnessed  a  tremendous  growth  of  experimental 
research.  A  large  body  of  experimental  evidence  casts  substantial  doubt  on  the 
assumption  of  self-regarding  preferences  which  underlies  traditional  microeconomic 
models. According to this assumption, people are exclusively concerned about their own 
material payoffs. By contrast, experimental studies show that reciprocal motivations often 
play a role in individual decision-making. Individuals with reciprocal inclinations place 
direct utility on rewarding or punishing others’ behavior. Hence, they respond to others’ 
behavior even if responding is not in their material self-interest. This has an important 
consequence. The increased willingness to reward or punish others’ behavior may help 
sustain cooperation when contracts are incomplete. 
  While experimental studies have provided substantial insight into the functioning 
of  reciprocity  in  stylized  laboratory  settings,  research  on  the  relationship  between 
reciprocity  and  real  world  institutions  remains  in  its  infancy.  Behavioral  economists 
emphasize  that  reciprocity  is  one  of  the  most  important  social  motivations  with 
potentially far reaching effects (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 2003, Dohmen et al. 2009, Fehr 
and  Gaechter  2000a).  This  calls  for  real  world  investigations  on  the  economic 
implications of reciprocity, specifically for labor relations and labor market institutions. 
As  suggested  by  Altmann  et  al.  (2008),  it  appears  to  be  particularly  interesting  to 
investigate  the  sorting  of  individuals  with  heterogeneous  reciprocal  inclinations  into 
institutional settings that differ in their contract enforcement mechanisms. 
  Using unique survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we 
respond to this call by examining the influence of reciprocal inclinations on workers’   2 
sorting into firms with and without works councils. Works councils provide a highly 
developed mechanism for establishment-level codetermination. They have legally defined 
functions that are distinct from those of unions. Works councils are designed to play an 
information  sharing  and  contract  enforcement  role (Freeman  and  Lazear  1995).  They 
foster cooperative employer-employee relations by reducing the risk that the employer 
reneges  on  promises  made  to  the  employees.  Examining  the  relationship  between 
reciprocity  and  works  councils  is  also  important  from  a  practical  viewpoint.  Works 
councils  play  a  role  in  corporate  governance  and  industrial  relations  in  many  West 
European countries (Rogers and Streeck 1995). Specifically German works councils have 
acquired extensive powers compared to councils in other countries. Moreover, nonunion 
worker representation has also received considerable attention outside Europe. In South 
Korea, mandated works councils deal with productivity concerns, employee training, and 
health and safety issues (Kleiner and Lee 1997). In Canada, mandatory health and safety 
committees have been introduced in several provinces. Further, committees must be set 
up in case of layoffs. The committees are similar to European works councils. In the U.S., 
the  interest  in  nonunion  representation  has  been  spurred  by  a  sharp  decline  in  union 
density and the growth of a ‘representation gap’ (Freeman and Rogers 1999). Much of the 
discussion has centered on the idea of mandating German-style works councils. 
  Our  estimates  show  that  negative  reciprocity  (punishing  those  who  hurt)  and 
positive  reciprocity  (rewarding  those  who  help)  play  different  roles  in  the  taste  for 
representation. Employees with strong negative reciprocal inclinations are more likely to 
work  in  firms  with  a  works  council.  This  finding  conforms  to  our  theoretical 
expectations. A works council monitors the employer’s behavior and increases workers’   3 
power to punish opportunistic defections by the employer. Hence, it attracts negative 
reciprocal  workers  who  place  high  value  on  punishing  employer  opportunism.  By 
contrast, employees with strong positive reciprocal inclinations are less likely to work in 
firms  with  a  works  council.  That  finding  supports  expectations  derived  from  the 
experimental literature. Employees with strong positive reciprocal inclinations prefer a 
work environment where social distance is low and cooperative behavior by others is not 
forced by a third party. Worker representation does not appear to meet these preferences. 
If a works council speaks for the workforce, direct communication between employees 
and management is likely to be reduced. This results in increased social distance between 
management and employees. Moreover, workers may perceive the employer’s behavior 
as forced by the council. Hence, employees with strong positive reciprocal inclinations 
sort into alternative work environments without works councils to live out their reciprocal 
preferences. 
  The SOEP  also  provides information  on  whether  or  not  an  employee  him-  or 
herself is a works councilor. This appears to be important as it helps avoid confusing the 
determinants of two different sorting processes. On the one hand, employees may sort 
into codetermined firms in order to be protected from employer opportunism. On the 
other  hand,  employees  in  firms  with  works  councils  may  themselves  become  works 
councilors. Taking both selection processes into account corroborates our key finding that 
negative  and  positive  reciprocity  play  a role in the first sorting process.  We  find no 
evidence that reciprocity plays a role in the second sorting process. 
  Furthermore, we examine if gender plays a moderating role in the relationship 
between  reciprocity  and  taste  for  representation.  While  an  increasing  number  of   4 
econometric studies documents that men and women often differ in their psychological 
attributes (Bertrand 2011, Croson and Gneezy 2009), our analysis provides evidence that 
men and women also differ in the way psychological attributes translate into labor market 
behavior.  Separate  estimates  by  gender  show  that  the  reciprocity  variables  take 
statistically  significant  coefficients  in  the  male  subsample,  but  not  in  the  female 
subsample. In order to examine if these gender differences are driven by women’s lower 
average degree of labor force attachment, we further split the female subsample into full-
time  and  part-time  employees.  While  positive  reciprocity  remains  insignificant,  the 
effects of negative reciprocity turn out to be different for both types of female employees. 
Negative reciprocity is a significant determinant in the subsample of female full-time 
employees,  but  not  in  the  subsample  of  female  part-time  employees.  Hence,  gender-
specific differences in the association between reciprocity and taste for representation can 
be at least partially explained by gender-specific differences in the average degree of 
labor force attachment. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background 
discussion. Section 3 describes data, variables and methodology. Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background Discussion 
2.1 Reciprocity 
Contractual incompleteness imposes limits on the set of explicit labor contracts that can 
be enforced by a neutral third party outside the firm. Therefore, informal agreements and 
unwritten  codes  of  conduct  play  an  important  role  in  employment  relationships.  For 
example, the employer may promise to pay higher wages if workers exert higher effort   5 
(Baker et al. 1994, Bull 1987). Or she may promise to insure risk-averse workers against 
cyclical wage fluctuations in the labor market to obtain an implicit insurance premium 
from the workers (Bertrand 2004). Under specific circumstances, such implicit contracts 
can be self-enforcing. One fundamental requirement for self-enforcement is that workers 
are  willing  to  reward  cooperative  employer  behavior  and  to  punish  employer 
opportunism.  The  employer  will  keep  her  promise  if  workers  respond  to  generous 
employer behavior with high effort and punish employer opportunism by refusing effort 
and cooperation. 
  A purely self-interested homo economicus rewards or punishes the employer’s 
behavior only to the extent that rewarding and punishing involve personal material gains. 
By contrast, homo reciprocans gains direct utility from responding in kind (Cox et al. 
2007, Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Rabin 1993). Hence, homo reciprocans may reward or 
punish employer behavior even if this involves a personal material cost. Experimental 
research suggests that reciprocal behavior can indeed play a role in many situations (Fehr 
and Gaechter 2000a). Positive reciprocity has been documented in trust or gift exchange 
experiments (Berg et al. 1995, Fehr et al. 1998). Negative reciprocity has been found in 
public goods and bargaining experiments (Camerer and Thaler 1995, Fehr and Gaechter 
2000b, Gueth et al. 1982). Finally, experimental studies provide evidence that reciprocity 
can make implicit contracts self-enforcing (Brown et al. 2004, Fehr et al. 1997, Gaechter 
and Falk 2002). As reciprocal workers are more willing to reward or punish employer 
behavior, the employer has a stronger incentive to behave cooperatively. 
  Altogether,  experimental  research  suggests  that  reciprocity  is  an  important 
motivation  driving  the  behavior  of  people.
1  However,  Dohmen  et  al.  (2008,  2009)   6 
provide  survey  evidence  showing  that  there  is  substantial  heterogeneity  in  reciprocal 
traits.  This  applies  to  both  negative  and  positive  reciprocity.  The  existence  of 
heterogeneous  reciprocal  traits  raises  the  question  of  whether  workers  with  different 
reciprocal inclinations sort themselves into different types of firms. Firms may differ in 
the  circumstances  that  allow  workers  to  live  out  their  reciprocal  preferences.  Hence, 
workers with strong reciprocal inclinations should prefer to work in firms where they face 
increased opportunities to respond to the employer’s behavior. This brings us to the role 
of worker representation. 
 
2.2 Works Councils 
In Germany, works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for establishment-
level codetermination. Their rights are defined in the Works Constitution Act (WCA). 
Workers in any establishment with five or more employees may elect council members 
but the creation of the council depends on the initiative of the establishment’s employees. 
Hence, councils are not present in all eligible establishments. Works councils negotiate 
over a bundle of interrelated establishment policies. On some issues they have the right to 
information and consultation, on others a veto power over management initiatives and on 
still others the right to coequal participation in the design and implementation of policy. 
Works councils are institutionalized bodies of worker representation that have functions 
that are distinct from those of unions. They do not have the right to strike. If council and 
management fail to reach an agreement, they may appeal to an internal arbitration board. 
The aim is to limit rent-seeking activities on the establishment level. Works councils are 
rather designed to foster and sustain cooperative employer-employee relationships. 
The  institutional  design  suggests  that  establishment-level  codetermination  may   7 
provide  opportunities  for  employees  to  live  out  their  reciprocal  preferences.  The 
responses of reciprocal people depend on how they perceive the underlying intentions of 
others’ behavior (Charness 2004, Charness and Levine 2007, Falk et al. 2003, 2008). 
People  tend  to  reciprocate  others’  actions  if  they  view  those  actions  as  intentional. 
Reciprocity is weak where intentions play no role. To provide an example, reciprocal 
workers are likely to respond negatively to a wage reduction voluntarily chosen by an 
opportunistic employer whereas they may accept a wage cut mandated by poor economic 
conditions.  Distinguishing  between  these  two  situations  requires  that  workers  have 
sufficient  information  about  decision  processes  and  economic  circumstances.
2  The 
information rights of the works council reduce information asymmetries so that workers 
can better evaluate the employer’s behavior and intention. Moreover, a council increases 
workers’ power to respond to the employer’s behavior. The council may not only make 
workers’ responses more effective by coordinating their actions. The council has also 
substantial  influence  on  the  speed  and  quality  of  decision  processes  within  the 
establishment. 
  However, this does not necessarily imply that codetermination attracts all types of 
reciprocal  workers.  Several  reasons  suggest  that  specifically  workers  with  negative 
reciprocal inclinations should be interested in worker representation. Theoretical models 
stress that organizations of worker representation protect workers’ interest by monitoring 
the  employer  (Askildsen  et  al.  2006,  Freeman  and  Lazear  1995,  Smith  1991)  and 
punishing employer opportunism (Hogan 2001). Empirical research confirms that works 
councils are more likely to be introduced by the workforce if the employer has a strong 
incentive  to  behave  opportunistically  (Jirjahn  2009,  2010,  Kraft  and  Lang  2008,   8 
Mohrenweiser et al. 2011). There is also evidence that works councils play a specific role 
in  sustaining  cooperation  and  performance  in  such  a  situation  (Jirjahn  2011,  Stettes 
2010). Altogether, both theoretical and empirical research suggests that works councils 
can enforce implicit contracts by threatening to punish opportunistic employers. Thus, 
establishment-level codetermination may specifically provide opportunities for negative 
reciprocal workers to live out their preferences. 
Furthermore, codetermination may attract negative reciprocal workers because of 
increased  employment  protection.  Workers  who  are  willing  to  punish  employer 
opportunism  are  likely  to  face  a  higher  probability  of  dismissal.  An  opportunistic 
employer may avoid to be punished by replacing current workers with new hires. Hence, 
increased employment protection may be particularly important for negative reciprocal 
workers. Establishment-level codetermination provides such protection as several rights 
of the works council are directly related to employment decisions. The consent rights of 
work councils cover the engagement of workers. Moreover, councils can bargain over 
social  compensation  plans.  They  have  the  right  to  demand  compensation  for  the 
dislocation caused by plant closings and major changes in organization. Finally, councils 
have consultation rights with respect to individual dismissals. 
  While our theoretical considerations predict that codetermination attracts negative 
reciprocal  employees,  there  is  no  clear  prediction  that  codetermination  also  attracts 
employees with positive reciprocal inclinations. On the one hand, the works council as a 
voice  institution  may  help  positive  reciprocal  workers  in  responding  to  generous 
employer  behavior.
3  If,  for  example,  employees  have  information  about  potentially 
performance-enhancing innovations, the works council may aggregate and communicate   9 
this information to management as a reciprocal gift. On the other hand, experimental 
evidence shows that positive reciprocity motivates behavior only when social distance 
between people is low but not when social distance is high (Cox and Deck 2005). Worker 
representation means that the works council speaks for the employees. This is likely to 
reduce  direct  communication  between  employees  and  management  and,  hence, 
contributes  to  increased  social  distance  between  workforce  and  employer.  Moreover, 
experimental  studies  provide  evidence  of  a  responsibility-alleviation  effect  (Charness 
2000).  People  are  less  likely  to  reciprocate  others’  generosity  if  they  perceive  this 
generosity  as  being  forced  by  a  third  party.  This  has  immediate  implications  for 
codetermination. One important function of a works council is to monitor the employer. 
To the extent employees perceive generous employer behavior as being determined by 
the  works  council,  their  internal  impulses  toward  loyalty  and  reciprocity  may  be 
dampened.  
If the latter effects dominate, employees with positive reciprocal inclinations may 
view  codetermination  as  a  social  context  in  which  they  cannot  fully  live  out  their 
reciprocal  preferences.  Instead  of  working  in  codetermined  establishments  they  may 
prefer to work in establishments where management is solely responsible for decisions 
and  opportunities  for  more  direct  communication  with  management  are  available. 
Findings by Jirjahn and Smith (2006) suggest that those establishments are more likely to 
use forms of direct worker participation in order to build cooperative industrial relations. 
 
2.3 The Moderating Role of Gender and Labor Force Attachment 
In what follows, we will also examine if gender plays a role in the relationship between 
reciprocity  and  taste  for  representation.  There  is  an  overwhelming  body  of  studies   10 
showing that male and female workers often differ in their labor market behavior. One 
reason may be that, on average, there appear to be differences in psychological attributes 
between men and women (Bertrand 2011). This also holds true for reciprocity. Dohmen 
et al. (2008) show that, on average, women are less reciprocal than men.
4 
However, even those male and female workers who share the same psychological 
attributes may behave differently. Women are typically disproportionately responsible for 
household production. Evidence from the German time use survey shows that working 
mothers spend substantially more time on child care than working fathers (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2003). Ross and Mirowski (1988) find for the U.S. that difficulty in arranging 
child care dramatically reduces the psychological well-being of working mothers but has 
no effect on husbands. The disproportionate responsibility for family implies that women 
on average have a lower force attachment than men (Heywood and Jirjahn 2002). They 
have substantially lower tenure and sort into jobs that allow flexibility between work and 
family.  This  suggests  that  labor  force  attachment  may  influence  the  way  in  which 
psychological attributes such as reciprocal traits translate into labor market behavior. Due 
to their disproportionate responsibility for household production women place a higher 
value  on  family  than  on  work.  Hence,  they  may  be  less  inclined  to  live  out  their 
reciprocal preferences in the workplace. As a consequence, we should observe that the 
link between reciprocity and taste for representation is weaker for female employees. 
  Of course, even though women’s labor force attachment is on average relatively 
low, there is variation in the labor force attachment of female employees. To take this 
variation into account, we will distinguish between full-time and part-time employees. 
Specifically women working part-time should have a low labor force attachment. Part-  11 
time  jobs  are  preferred  by  female  employees  who  need  to  balance  work  and  family 
(Higgins et al. 2000). Those jobs are rather repetitive and peripheral jobs that are not part 
of the core internal labor market of a firm (Heywood et al. 2011). Thus, the link between 
reciprocity  and  the  taste  for  representation  should  be  specifically  weak  for  women 
working part-time. 
 
3. Data, Variables and Methodology 
Our empirical analysis uses data from the SOEP (Wagner et al. 1993, 2007). The SOEP is 
a large representative longitudinal survey of private households in Germany. Based on 
face-to-face interviews, a nucleus of socio-economic and demographic questions is asked 
annually. Different ‘special’ topics are sampled in specific waves. The 2005 wave of the 
survey includes a unique set of questions designed to identify each worker’s extent of 
reciprocity (Dohmen et al. 2008, 2009).
5 The information on reciprocity follows from a 
series of six statements to which workers are put the question “To what degree do the 
following statements apply to you personally?” Respondents choose on a one to seven 
point Likert scale ranging from “does not apply to me at all” to “applies to me perfectly.” 
There  are  three  statements  on  positive  reciprocity  and  three  statements  on  negative 
reciprocity. As an example of positive reciprocity, the statements include “If someone 
does me a favor, I am prepared to return it.” As an example of negative reciprocity, they 
include “If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her.” All 
six statements and the distributions of the responses are provided in Table 1. Note that the 
reciprocal  inclinations  identified  by  the  survey  are  general  personality  traits.  This  is 
useful as it reduces the likelihood that workers’ responses are influenced by a particular 
work setting. As emphasized by Dohmen et al. (2009), this, in turn, increases the chance   12 
that the reciprocal inclinations reflect exogenous variation in individuals. We construct 
scores  of  positive  and  negative  reciprocity  by  adding  up  the  underlying  variables 
associated with each type of reciprocity. As each item is coded from 0 to 6, the scores for 
positive and negative reciprocity can range from 0 to 18. 
  The dependent variable is taken from the 2006 wave. In this wave, employees 
were asked if a works council is present in the firm they work for. Table 2 shows that 51 
percent of the employees are covered by works councils. As the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous  variable,  our  estimates  fit  the  cumulative  normal  distribution  using  the 
probit  procedure.  We  limit  our  examination  to private  sector  employees  and  exclude 
apprentices  and  managerial  employees.
6  The  resulting  sample  consists  of  4368 
observations for which information is available. 
  The survey additionally provides information as to whether or not the employee 
her- or  himself  is  a  works  councilor. A  recent  controversy in Germany has  centered 
around  the  hypothesis  that  specifically  low  performing  workers  are  interested  in 
becoming a works councilor as works councilors cannot be easily dismissed (Behrens 
2010, Schnabel 2008, Stoermer 2010). Against this background it appears to be important 
to distinguish between the determinants influencing the taste for representation and the 
determinants of becoming a works councilor. We address this issue in two ways. First, we 
provide additional estimates in which works councilors are excluded from the analysis. 
Analyzing the determinants of working in a codetermined firm for those employees who 
are no works councilors serves as a robustness check to ensure that we really capture the 
influences on the taste for representation. Second, we estimate a bivariate probit model 
with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Pragg 1981). The basic idea is that we   13 
imagine a two-step sorting process. In the first step, employees sort into firms with or 
without works councils. In the second step, employees in establishments with a works 
council  may  become  a  works  councilor.  For  these  two  selection  processes,  two 
corresponding probits are jointly estimated. This allows us comparing the determinants of 
the taste for representation with the determinants of being a works councilor. The sample 
selection model corrects coefficient estimates for the selection bias introduced by the 
truncated sample of workers that are employed in firms with a works council (see the 
Appendix for details). 
  A  rich  set  of  control  variables  allows  isolating  the  role  of  reciprocity  and 
examining the influence of moderating factors. To examine the moderating role of gender 
we additionally perform separate estimates for men and women. Moreover, we perform 
separate analyses for female part-time and full-time employees to investigate if possible 
differences by gender are driven by the fact that women on average have a lower degree 
of labor force attachment.
7 
  Reciprocal inclinations can be associated with other personality traits, making it 
necessary to control for those traits. The SOEP provides unique information on a series of 
personality  characteristics.  First,  we  include  a  variable  for  the  individual’s  general 
willingness to trust in other people. Experimental evidence shows that reciprocity and 
trusting behavior can be correlated (Altmann et al. 2008). The general willingness to trust 
in other people may also be related to the taste for representation. Trust makes a worker 
more vulnerable to opportunistic defections by the employer.
8 This may increase the taste 
for  representation  as  worker  representation  is  one  way  to  decrease  the  degree  of 
vulnerability. Second, risk tolerance is controlled for. Works councils may also be an   14 
institution  that  protects  workers  against  the  risk  associated  with  economic  and 
organizational change (Mohrenweiser et al. 2011). This suggests that risk averse workers 
should be more interested in works councils. Third, we include variables for the so-called 
“Big  Five”,  namely  conscientiousness,  extraversion,  agreeableness,  openness  to  new 
experiences, and neuroticism. Dohmen et al. (2008) find that these personality traits are 
associated with reciprocity. The “Big Five” are often viewed as critical dimensions of 
noncognitive abilities (Heckman  et  al.  2006).  These  noncognitive  abilities might also 
influence the sorting of employees into codetermined firms. Fourth, we account for body 
height. Case and Paxton (2008) show that body height is related to cognitive ability. 
In the estimates, we also control for foreigners, age and the number of children 
living in the worker’s household. The employee’s human capital is captured by dummy 
variables for unskilled blue-collar workers (without formal qualification), skilled blue-
collar workers (with formal qualification), and university graduates. The reference group 
consists of white-collar workers without a university degree. We also control for union 
members. Even though works councils and unions are formally independent, there are 
important linkages (Hubler and Jirjahn 2003). Unions typically promote a positive view 
toward codetermination. Hence, union members are likely to be more interested in works 
councils. Furthermore, we include three firm size dummies. The size dummies define 
categories of firms with 20–199 employees, with 200–1999 employees, and with 2000 
and more employees. Works councils are more likely to be present in larger firms. Hence, 
controlling for firm size helps disentangle two  sorting processes, namely sorting into 
codetermined firms and sorting into larger firms. Moreover, we include seven industry 
dummies and a dummy variable for employees working in the former East Germany.   15 
This takes into account that the chance of finding a firm with a works council can differ 
across  industries  and  regions.  Specifically  in  East  Germany,  there  has  been  a  lower 
incidence of worker representation (Hyman 1996). 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Basic Estimates 
Table  3  provides  regression  results  for  the  combined  sample  of  male  and  female 
employees. The initial estimation is shown in column 1. Union members, older workers, 
foreigners, and workers in larger establishments are more likely to be covered by works 
councils. Unskilled blue-collar workers and workers in East Germany are less likely to be 
covered. Female part-time employees are also less likely to work in firms with a works 
council. This finding fits the notion that workers with low labor force attachment tend to 
be  employed  in  peripheral  sectors  where  worker  representation  is  more  often  absent. 
While risk tolerance does not emerge with a significant coefficient, trusting behavior is a 
significantly positive determinant. Trust makes a worker more vulnerable to employer 
opportunism. Protection through worker representation is one way to decrease the degree 
of  vulnerability.  Among  the  variables  for  the  “Big  Five”,  only  the  variable  for 
agreeableness  takes  a  significant  coefficient.  Employees  with  a  higher  degree  of 
agreeableness are more likely to work in firms with a works council. 
  Most  interestingly,  both  negative  and  positive  reciprocity  are  statistically 
significant determinants. Workers with strong negative reciprocal inclinations are more 
likely  to  be  employed  in  firms  with  a  works  council.  This  finding  conforms  to  the 
hypothesis that worker representation through works councils attracts negative reciprocal 
employees  as  it  provides  specific  opportunities  for  these  employees  to  live  out  their   16 
preferences. A works council is an institution designed to monitor the employer and to 
respond to employer opportunism. It increases workers’ power to punish opportunistic 
defections  by  the  employer.  By  contrast,  workers  with  strong  positive  reciprocal 
inclinations are less likely to be employed in firms with a works council. As suggested by 
experimental  studies,  positive  reciprocal  employees  prefer  a  context  in  which  social 
distance is low and the cooperative behavior by others with whom they interact is not 
forced by a third party. Worker representation does not appear to meet these preferences. 
A works council is an institution that speaks for the employees and, hence, reduces direct 
communication between employees and management. Moreover, because of its strong 
codetermination rights, the works council has substantial influence on decisions within 
the firm so that workers may perceive the employer’s behavior as forced by the council. 
Thus, positive reciprocal workers sort into alternative work environments without works 
councils to live out their reciprocal preferences. 
  Workers  may  not  only  be  covered  by  worker  representation.  They  may  be 
themselves  worker  representatives.  In  our  data,  3.8  percent  of  all  employees  (or  7.5 
percent of the employees covered by works councils) are works councilors. This raises 
the question of whether the determinants influencing the taste for representation differ 
from the determinants of becoming a works councilor. As a first check of robustness, we 
exclude works councilors from the analysis to ensure that we estimate the influences on 
the  taste  for  representation.  The  new  estimation  is  shown  in  column  2.  It  largely 
reproduces what was shown in column 1. Negative reciprocity increases the likelihood of 
being covered by works councils while positive reciprocity decreases it. 
  As a further check of robustness, we return to our initial sample and compare the   17 
determinants  of  the  taste  for  representation  with  the  determinants  of  being  a  works 
councilor. Only employees working in firms with a works council can become works 
councilors. This may entail a sample selection bias. To account for this potential bias we 
estimate a bivariate probit model with sample selection. Identification is achieved by 
excluding the dummy variable for East Germany from the works councilor equation. As 
works councils are less prevalent among East German firms, the location of the firm has a 
clear effect on the probability of being covered by a works council. Yet, given that a firm 
has  a  works  council,  there  is  no  reason  to  anticipate  that  the  location  of  the  firm 
influences the probability of being a works councilor within the firm.
9 
The results are shown in column 3 and 4. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis 
of independent equations. The positive correlations between the error terms, suggests that 
there are unobserved factors influencing both the likelihood of working in a firm with a 
works council and the likelihood of being a works councilor in the same direction. Most 
importantly,  this  robustness  check  provides  further  support  that  reciprocity  in  fact 
influences the taste for representation. While positive and negative reciprocity are again 
significant determinants in the probit on works council coverage, they play no significant 
role in the probit on being a works councilor. This suggests that reciprocal inclinations 
influence the sorting into codetermined firms regardless of whether or not employees 
become works councilors. The likelihood of being a works councilor is influenced by 
union membership and occupational status. Unskilled blue-collar workers are less likely 
and union members are more likely to be works councilors. 
 
4.2 Gender and Labor Force Attachment as Moderating Variables 
We  now  examine  if  gender  plays  a  moderating  role  in  the  relationship  between   18 
reciprocity  and  worker  representation.  Column  1  and  2  of  Table  4  provide  separate 
estimates for male and  female workers. The results show striking gender differences. 
Both reciprocity variables take statistically significant coefficients in the male subsample, 
but  not  in  the  female  subsample.  We  can  use  the  marginal  effects  to  assess  the 
magnitudes  of  the  (significant)  influences  on  men’s  taste  for  representation.  A  one 
standard  deviation  movement  up  the  categorical  ranking  of  positive  reciprocity  is 
associated with a 3.3 percentage point lower likelihood of being covered by a works 
council (2.586 x (-0.0127) = -0.0328). For a worker who otherwise would have the mean 
probability  of  0.511,  this  implies  a  6.4  percent  decrease  in  the  probability  of  being 
covered  by  a  council.  Furthermore,  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  negative 
reciprocity  entails  a  3.4 percentage  point  increase  in  the  likelihood  of  being  covered 
(4.346 x 0.0077 = 0.0335). Given the mean probability of 0.511, this is an increase by 6.6 
percent. 
  At issue is whether the gender differences in the link between reciprocity and 
worker representation can be explained by the fact that women’s labor force attachment is 
on average lower than that of men. Low labor force attachment may imply that women 
are less inclined to live out their reciprocal preferences in the workplace. To examine the 
role of labor attachment in women’s labor market behavior in more detail we take into 
account that there is variation in the labor force attachment of female employees. As 
emphasized,  part-time  work  typically  indicates  a  lower  and  full-time  work  a  higher 
degree of labor force attachment. Thus, we provide separate estimates for female full-
time  and  part-time  employees.  The  results  are  shown  in  column  3  and  4.  Positive 
reciprocity remains statistically insignificant in both estimates. By contrast, the separate   19 
estimates reveal that the role of negative reciprocity differs between women working 
part-time and women working full-time. While negative reciprocity is not statistically 
significant  in  the  subsample  of  female  part-time  employees,  it  takes  a  significantly 
positive coefficient in the subsample of female full-time employees. For female full-time 
workers,  a  one  standard  deviation  movement  up  the  categorical  ranking  of  negative 
reciprocity is associated with a 4.7 percentage point higher likelihood of being covered 
by  a  works  council.  Evaluated  at  the  mean  probability  of  being  covered,  this  is  an 
increase by 9.3 percent. Altogether, our results suggest that the gender differences in the 
relationship  between  reciprocity  and  taste  for  representation  at  least  can  be  partially 
explained by differences in the average degree of labor force attachment. 
  Finally, we note that the number of children plays opposite roles in the male 
subsample and in the subsample of female part-time employees. The number of children 
increases the probability that a male employee works in a firm with a works council. Men 
are typically the main earners of the family and, hence, are particularly concerned about 
their jobs. As a consequence, a larger number of children may increase their desire for 
protection from employer opportunism. By contrast, the number of children decreases the 
probability that a female part-time employee is covered by a works council. Part-time 
work is an indicator of low labor force attachment. A large number of children indicates 
an even lower labor force attachment and, hence, an even more pronounced sorting into 
peripheral jobs without worker representation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study combines two previously unrelated strands of literature, namely the literature 
on reciprocity and the literature on worker representation. While research on reciprocity   20 
has been predominantly conducted in stylized laboratory settings, we use survey data to 
examine the influence of reciprocal motivations on the sorting of workers into firms with 
and without works councils. Our results show that negative and positive reciprocity play 
different roles in the sorting process. Workers with strong negative reciprocal inclinations 
are attracted to codetermined firms. By contrast, workers with strong positive reciprocal 
inclinations sort away from codetermined firms. 
The  findings  have  a  crucial  implication.  Negative  and  positive  reciprocity  are 
often  thought  to  be  important  for  sustaining  cooperation  when  labor  contracts  are 
incomplete.  However,  the  functioning  of  reciprocity  depends  on  specific  institutional 
frameworks. Our results indicate that the effects of negative and positive reciprocity are 
reinforced  by  different  institutional  settings.  Codetermination  supports  the  contract-
enforcing  role  of  negative  reciprocity  as  it  strengthens  the  workers’  power  to  punish 
employer  opportunism.  Vice  versa,  workers’  willingness  to  respond  to  employer 
opportunism strengthens the bargaining position of the works council and, hence, makes 
codetermination more effective. Workers with strong positive inclinations sort away from 
codetermination because they are likely to prefer direct communication with management 
and cooperative employer-employee relationships that are not forced by a third party. 
Altogether, a variety of institutional settings across firms appears to be important to meet 
heterogeneous  reciprocal  preferences  of  workers.  Codetermination  is  one  important 
contract enforcement mechanism. But it appears to be not the only one. 
  Furthermore,  our  study  shows  that  reciprocal  inclinations  do  not  uniformly 
translate  into  labor  market  behavior.  Gender  and  labor  force  attachment  play  a 
moderating role in the relationship between reciprocity and taste for representation. This   21 
indicates  that  the  contract-enforcing  role  of  reciprocity  does  not  only  depend  on 
institutional settings within firms but also on the broader societal context. There appears 
to be no automatism which ensures that reciprocity always takes its contract-enforcing 
role. 
We conclude this paper with suggestions for future research. First, it would be 
interesting  to  extend  this  type  of  research  to  other  countries.  As  emphasized,  worker 
representation plays a role in many other countries. Investigating the relationship between 
reciprocity  and  worker  representation  in  comparative  perspective  could  yield  further 
insight into role the specific institutional design plays in the taste  for  representation. 
Second, future research could fruitfully examine the employer characteristics that attract 
positive reciprocal workers. If positive reciprocal workers prefer low social distance, they 
may sort into firms which have implemented forms of direct worker participation. Third, 
it  would  be  interesting  to  examine  if  the  economic  effects  of  worker  representation 
depend  on  the  composition  of  the  workforce.  A  high  share  of  negative  reciprocal 
employees should increase the bargaining power of the works council. This in turn may 
influence the effects the works council has on productivity and innovativeness.   22 
Appendix: Bivariate Probit Model with Sample Selection 
Let us define employee i’s decision to work in a codetermined firm by 
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where  i 1 x   is  the  vector  of  explanatory  variables,  1 β   the  vector  of  coefficients  and 
) 1   , 0 ( ~ 1 N u i  the error term. Furthermore, let  i y2  indicate whether or not employee i is a 
works councilor: 
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with the latent model  
      , * 2 2 2 2 i i i u y + = x ' β                    (4) 
where  i 2 x   is  the  vector  of  explanatory  variables,  2 β   the  vector  of  coefficients  and 
) 1   , 0 ( ~ 2 N u i  the error term. The employee can only become a works councilor if a works 
council is present. Hence, whether or not the employee is a works councilor can only be 
observed  if  he  or  she  works  in  a  codetermined  firm.  When  0 ) , ( 2 1 ≠ ≡ u u corr ρ , 
estimating the coefficients in (4) with the standard probit procedure yields biased results. 
Consistent  estimates  can  be  obtained  by  using  a  bivariate  probit  model  with  sample 
selection (Van de Ven and Van Pragg 1981). The coefficients in (2) and (4) are jointly 
estimated by ML. The joint log likelihood is   23 
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where  () 2 Φ   is  the  cumulative  bivariate  normal  distribution  function  and  () Φ   is  the 
standard cumulative normal. 
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Table 1: Components of positive and negative reciprocity (N = 4368) 
 
  Positive reciprocity    Negative Reciprocity 
  P1  P2  P3    N1  N2  N3 
0 (does not apply to me at all)  0.23  0.41  2.01    17.28  21.11  16.16 
1  0.18  0.82  3.27    20.05  24.43  21.20 
2  0.53  2.13  5.70    19.02  20.54  18.82 
3  2.47  7.90  15.84    19.60  16.46  19.96 
4  6.71  16.92  23.92    11.81  9.57  11.97 
5  26.17  34.87  27.06    6.16  4.46  6.75 
6 (applies to me perfectly)  63.71  36.95  22.18    6.07  3.43  5.13 
  100.00  100.00  100.00    100.00  100.00  100.00 
Relative frequencies (in %) are based on the survey question “To what degree do the following 
statements apply to you personally?” answered on a seven-level Likert scale as shown in table. 
P1: If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it. 
P2: I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before. 
P3: I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before. 
N1: If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost. 
N2: If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her. 
N3: If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back.   29 
Table 2: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (N = 4368) 
 




Dummy = 1 if the employee works for a firm that has a works council (.511, .410) 
Works councilor 
 
Dummy = 1 if the employee is a works councilor (.038, .192) 
Positive reciprocity 
 
Score of adding up the variables P1-P3 shown in table 1 (14.674, 2.586)  
Negative reciprocity 
 
Score of adding up the variables N1-N3 shown in table 1 (6.586, 4.346) 
Trust in others  Score of trust in others constructed from adding up three survey items measured on a four-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 “agree completely” to 4 “disagree completely”. The items 
are “On the whole one can trust people”, “Nowadays one can’t trust people”, “One has to be 
careful, when dealing with strangers”. The first item was recoded in inverse order before 
adding up. (6.921, 1.574) 
Risk tolerance  Score of risk tolerance. Answers from the survey question “How do you see yourself: Are 
you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking 
risks?” are coded on an 11-point Likert scale (4.933; 2.100) 
Conscientiousness  Score of conscientiousness constructed from adding up three survey items measured on a 
seven-point Likert scale ranging from 0 “does not apply to me at all” to 6 “applies to me 
perfectly”. The items are: I see myself as someone who… “does a thorough job”, “does 
things effectively and efficiently”, “tends to be lazy”. The last item was recoded in inverse 
order before adding up. (15.117, 2.460) 
Extraversion  Score of extraversion constructed from adding up three survey items measured on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from 0 “does not apply to me at all” to 6 “applies to me 
perfectly”. The items are: I see myself as someone who… “is communicative”, “is 
sociable”, “is reserved”. The last item was recoded in inverse order before adding up. 
(11.446, 3.373) 
Agreeableness  Score of agreeableness constructed from adding up three survey items measured on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from 0 “does not apply to me at all” to 6 “applies to me 
perfectly”. The items are: I see myself as someone who… “is sometimes somewhat rude to 
others”, “has a forgiving nature”, “is considerate and kind to others”. The first item was 
recoded in inverse order before adding up. (13.220, 2.871) 
Openness  Score of openness constructed from adding up three survey items measured on a seven-point 
Likert scale ranging from 0 “does not apply to me at all” to 6 “applies to me perfectly”. The 
items are: I see myself as someone who… “is original ”, values artistic experiences”, “has an 
active imagination”. (10.269, 3.465) 
Neuroticism  Score of neuroticism constructed from adding up three survey items measured on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from 0 “does not apply to me at all” to 6 “applies to me 
perfectly”. The items are: I see myself as someone who… “worries a lot”, “gets nervous 
easily”, “deals well with stress”. The last item was recoded in inverse order before adding 
up. (8.518, 3.504) 
Body height 
 
Reported body height in cm (173.22, 9.21) 
Full-time woman 
 
Dummy = 1 if the employee is a woman with contracted weekly hours of more than 30 
hours (.235, .424) 




Age of the employee (42.23, 10.10) 
Foreigner 
 
Dummy = 1 if the employee is a foreigner (.084, .277)   30 
Children 
 
Number of children living in the employee’s household (.875, 1.036) 
Unskilled blue-collar 
 
Dummy = 1 if the employee has a blue-collar job that does not require a completed 
apprenticeship training (.167, 373) 
Skilled blue-collar 
 
Dummy = 1 if the employee has a blue-collar job that requires a completed apprenticeship 
training (.223, 416) 
University degree 
 
Dummy = 1 if the employee has a university degree (.188, .391) 
Union member 
 
Dummy = 1 if the employee is the member of a trade union (.181, .385) 
Firm size 20-199 
 
Dummy = 1 if the worker is employed in a firm with 20 to 199 employees (.296, .456) 
Firm size 200-1999 
 
Dummy = 1 if the worker is employed in a firm with 200 to 1999 employees (.215, .411) 
Firm size ≥ 2000 
 
Dummy=1 if the worker is employed in a firm with more than 1999 employees (.215, 411) 
East 
 
Dummy = 1 if the employee works in an Eastern German firm (.205, .404) 
Industry dummies  
 
7 broad 1 digit controls for industrial sector 
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Table 3: Determinants of working in a firm with a works council 
 
 


























Positive reciprocity  -.0202  [-.0080]  -.0204  [-.0081  -.0199  [-.0080]  .0042  [.0003] 
(.0100)**  (.0102)**  (.0099)**  (.0165) 
Negative reciprocity  .0146  [.0058]  .0134  [.0053]  .0145  [.0058]  .0133  [.0012] 
(.0061)**  (.0062)**  (.0061)**  (.0100) 
Trust in others  .0512  [.0204]  .0564  [.0224]  .0520  [.0208]  -.0241  [-.0021] 
(.0160)***  (.0163)***  (.0159)***  (.0269) 
Risk tolerance  -.0120  [-.0048]  -.0123  [-.0048]  -.0124  [-.0049]  -.0001  [-.00002] 
(.0122)  (.0125)  (.0122)  (.0206) 
Conscientiousness  .0001  [.00004]  .0001  [.00004]  .0012  [.0004]  .0145  [.0013] 
(.0110)  (.0113)  (.0110)  (.0183) 
Extraversion  .0018  [.0007]  .0024  [.0009]  .0028  [.0011]  .0115  [.0010] 
(.0080)  (.0082)  (.0080)  (.0138) 
Agreeableness  .0163  [.0065]  .0147  [.0058]  .0157  [.0063]  .0052  [.0005] 
(.0097)*  (.0099)  (.0097)  (.0157) 
Openness  -.0035  [-.0014]  -.0046  [-.0018]  -.0035  [-.0014]  .0199  [.0018] 
(.0077)  (.0079)  (.0077)  (0131) 
Neuroticism  -.0031  [-.0012]  -.0028  [-.0011]  -.0028  [-.0011]  .0051  [.0005] 
(.0074)  (.0076)  (.0074)  (.0122) 
Body height  -.0002  [-.0001]  -.0011  [-.0004]  -.0006  [-.0002]  .0031  [.0003] 
(.0037)  (.0038)  (.0037)  (.0059) 
Full-time woman  -.0688  [-.0275]  -.0762  [-.0303]  -.0722  [-.0288]  -.0085  [-.0009] 
(.0803)  (.0821)  (.0801)  (.1345) 
Part-time woman  -.1508  [-.0601]  -.1453  [-.0575]  -.1538  [-.0613]  -.2005  [-.0160] 
(.0857)*  (.0877)*  (.0857)*  (.1568) 
Age  .0044  [.0018]  .0039  [.0016]  .0042  [.0017]  .0042  [.0004] 
(.0025)*  (.0026)  (.0025)*  (.0044) 
Foreigner  .2857  [.1129]  .2910  [.1156]  .2999  [.1184]  .1877  [.0194] 
(.0941)***  (.0961)***  (.0940)***  (.1384) 
Children  .0185  [.0074]  .0176  [.0070]  .0169  [.0078]  .0510  [.0046] 
(.0245)  (.0250)  (.0244)  (.0398)* 
Unskilled blue-collar  -.1251  [-.0498]  -.1009  [-.0400]  -.1264  [-.0504]  -.3419  [-.0241] 
(.0725)*  (.0737)  (.0724)*  (.1427)** 
Skilled blue-collar  -.0896  [-.0357]  -.1089  [-.0432]  -.0942  [-.0375]  .1073  [.0108] 
(.0725)  (.0743)  (.0722)  (.1139) 
University degree  .0962  [.0384]  .1002  [.0399]  .0884  [.0352]  -.1938  [-.0157] 
(.0689)  (.0701)  (.0688)  (.1252) 
Union member  .6763  [.2594]  .6383  [.2486]  .6886  [.2637]  .6936  [.0825] 
(.0702)***  (.0725)***  (.0701)***  (.0908)*** 
Firm size 20 – 199  1.3905  [.3849]  1.3825  [.3627]  1.3882  [.3842]  .4350  [.0338] 
(.0736)***  (.0764)***  (.0736)***  (.3347) 
Firm size 200 – 1999  2.4643  [.7636]  2.4891  [.7602]  2.4652  [.7639]  .4405  [.0378] 
(.0832)***  (.0857)***  (.0832)***  (.4014) 
Firm size ≥ 2000  2.6310  [.8027]  2.6678  [.8038]  2.6334  [.8033]  .3489  [.0297] 
(.0859)***  (.0883)***  (.0859)***  (.4064) 
East  -.1861  [-.0740]  -.1767  [-.0697]  -.1709  [-.0680] 
-- 
(.0612)***  (.0626)**  (.0611)**   32 
Constant  -1.8496  -1.7197  -1.8130  -3.5320 
(.7579)**  (.7774)**  (.7581)**  (1.2655)** 
Industry controls 
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R² 
  .4240  .4277  --  -- 
Observations 




--  --  2232 
Rho 
  --  --  .5529 
χ² (Wald test of 
independent equations) 
 
--  --  2.87* 
Log likelihood 
  -1743.3  -1666.1  -2282.8 
Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses  and  marginal  effects  are  in  square  brackets.  Marginal  effects  of  dummy 
variables  are  evaluated  for  a  discrete  change  from  0  to  1.  Marginal  effects  of  the  dummies  for  firm  size 
(occupational qualification, female working hours) are changes in probability compared to the reference group of 
firms with less than 20 employees (reference group of white-collar employees without university degree, reference 
group of male employees). Marginal effects of variables other than the dummy variables are evaluated at the mean 
values. ***Statistically significant at the one percent level; **at the five percent level; *at the ten percent level. 
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Table 4: Determinants of working in a firm with a works council; the moderating role of gender 
 












Positive reciprocity  -.0331  [-.0127]  -.0095  [-.0036]  .0064  [.0025]  -.0215  [-.0070] 
(.0140)**  (.0145)  (.0203)  (.0217) 
Negative reciprocity  .0201  [.0077]  .0097  [.0036]  .0275  [.0109]  -.0069  [-.0022] 
(.0084)**  (.0091)  (.0128)**  (.0137) 
Trust in others  .0381  [.0146]  .0706  [.0264]  .0786  [.0312]  .0775  [.0251] 
(.0216)*  (.0243)**  (.0334)**  (.0367)** 
Risk tolerance  -.0087  [-.0033]  -.0146  [-.0055]  -.0187  [-.0074]  -.0078  [-.0019] 
(.0169)  (.0181)  (.0251)  (.0271) 
Conscientiousness  .0007  [.0003]  .0009  [.0004]  -.0088  [-.0035]  .0096  [.0031] 
(.0148)  (.0171)  (.0247)  (.0245) 
Extraversion  .0029  [.0011]  .0008  [.0003]  .0007  [.0003]  .0071  [.0023] 
(.0113)  (.0116)  (.0157)  (.0179) 
Agreeableness  .0022  [.0009]  .0335  [.0125]  .0371  [.0147]  .0281  [.0091] 
(.0130)  (.0149)**  (.0201)*  (.0229) 
Openness  -.0060  [-.0023]  .0024  [.0009]  -.0098  [-.0039]  .0119  [.0039] 
(.0108)  (.0113)  (.0155)  (.0171) 
Neuroticism  -.0031  [-.0012]  -.0053  [-.0020]  -.0044  [-.0017]  -.0006  [-.0002] 
(.0105)  (.0106)  (.0147)  (.0160) 
Body height  -.0035  [-.0013]  .0041  [.0015]  .0074  [.0029]  .0038  [.0012] 
(.0049)  (.0058)  (.0081)  (.0088) 
Age  .0073  [.0028]  .0007  [.0002]  .0058  [.0023]  -.0066  [-.0021] 
(.0035)**  (.0038)  (.0051)  (.0062) 
Foreigner  .2072  [.0769]  .3718  [.1445]  .5025  [.1971]  .2707  [.0934] 
(.1290)  (.1401)**  (.2229)**  (.1872) 
Children  .0615  [.0235]  -.0674  [-.0252]  .0417  [.0165]  -.1433  [-.0464] 
(.0313)**  (.0415)  (.0672)  (.0564)** 
Unskilled blue-collar  -.0305  [-.0117]  -.1431  [-.3190]  -.2457  [-.0963]  -.0513  [-.0164] 
(.1090)  (.1004)  (.1543)  (.1366) 
Skilled blue-collar  -.0076  [-.0029]  -.1222  [-.3265]  -.1994  [-.0785]  -.0209  [-.0068] 
(.0894)  (.1625)  (.2151)  (.2681) 
University degree  .1979  [.0742]  -.0256  [-.0096]  -.0951  [-.0371]  .1071  [.0355] 
(.0967)**  (.1022)  (.1311)  (.1721) 
Union member  .7427  [.2587]  .5810  [.2266]  .6676  [.2588]  .5289  [.1906] 
(.0896)***  (.1188)***  (.1634)***  (.1840)*** 
Full-time woman 
-- 
.0168  [.0063] 
--  -- 
(.0828) 
Firm size 20 – 199  1.4405  [.4231]  1.3796  [.3454]  1.4618  [.3815]  1.3529  [.3181] 
(.1083)***  (.1037)***  (.1590)***  (.1428)*** 
Firm size 200 – 1999  2.4777  [.7711]  2.4931  [.7518]  2.6471  [.7938]  2.3664  [.7016] 
(.1194)***  (.1207)***  (.1792)***  (.1745)*** 
Firm size ≥2000  2.8921  [.8518]  2.4279  [.7332]  2.4261  [.7353]  2.4193  [.7183] 
(.1297)***  (.1195)***  (.1802)***  (.1683)*** 
East  -.2837  [-.1105]  -.0794  [-.0294]  -.0654  [-.1042]  .1018  [.0337] 
(.0850)***  (.0912)  (.1228)**  (.1471) 
Constant  -1.0167  -3.2999  -3.7543  -.3.7492 
(1.0042)  (1.1525)***  (1.6244)**  (1.7520)** 
Industry controls 
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   34 
Pseudo R² 
  .4365  .3996  .4050  .3954 
Observations 
  2404  1964  1027  937 
Log likelihood 
  -919.2  -802.2  -423.4  -364.1 
Dependent variable: Works council incidence. Method: Probit. Standard errors are in parentheses and marginal 
effects are in square brackets. Marginal effects of dummy variables are evaluated for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
Marginal effects of the dummies for firm size (occupational qualification, female working hours) are changes in 
probability compared to the reference group of firms with less than 20 employees (reference group of white-collar 
employees without university degree, reference group of male employees). Marginal effects of variables other than 
the dummy variables are evaluated at the mean values. ***Statistically significant at the one percent level; **at the 
five percent level; *at the ten percent level. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See Fehr et al. (2005) for the neuroeconomic foundations of such social preferences. 
2  Mitzkewitz  and  Nagel  (1993)  and  Hennig-Schmidt  et  al.  (2010)  provide  evidence  that 
information asymmetry has indeed an influence on reciprocal behavior. Asymmetric information 
appears to negatively affect cooperation. 
3 See Freeman and Medoff (1984) for the classical voice model of worker representation. 
4While experimental studies  provide  mixed evidence  on the relationship  between  gender  and 
reciprocity (Croson and Gneezy 2009), the examination by Dohmen et al. (2008) demonstrates 
that it can be crucial to control for other personality traits to identify that relationship. 
5 Cornelissen et al. (2010) use this information to examine the selection of workers into firms 
with profit sharing plans. 
6 Managerial employees are excluded as the WCA does not apply to this group of employees. 
Apprentices  are  excluded  as  this  is  a  group  of  very  young  and  inexperienced  workers  with 
restricted mobility during the period of their apprenticeship training. 
7 We do not distinguish between male full-time and part-time employees as most men in our 
sample work full-time. 
8 See Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and James Jr. (2002) for a general discussion on trust, 
vulnerability and the fear of exploitation. 
9 We also estimated a univariate probit of being a works councilor in which we included the 
dummy  variable  for  East  Germany.  The  dummy  variable  did  not  emerge  as  a  significant 
determinant. While including the identifying variable in a single-equation model provides no 
formal test of the validity of that variable, it offers a clear sense of the patterns in the data and 
provides useful indications (Evans and Schwab 1995). 